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Economy

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    The basic econometric model for the suggested interaction effect of resource endowments and institutional quality on economic growth is borrowed from Boschini et al., 2007 and Brunnschweiler, 2007. Rather than the government indicators used by Kaufman et al. (2010), which are widely used to measure institutional quality, I used CIM in this study as a proxy for institutional quality as proposed by Clague et al. (1999. It has been suggested that societies accumulate potential gains from business activity and that trade is boosted by effective contract enforcement and property rights. The level of the potential gains that a society can capture could be approximated by the relative amount of money in use. CIM was defined in Clague et al. (1999) as follows: Inst=(M_2-C))/M_2, where M_2 is the money supply including currency and deposits, and C is the amount of currency in circulation. If Inst (CIM) is a good proxy for contract enforcement and property rights in a broad sense, it should also be a good indicator of a government’s role in the economy in the following ways: (a) as a third-party enforcer of transactions and trades that cannot be realized otherwise; (b) as an intermediary institution that links breaches of contract; (c) as having the capacity to establish rules and arrangements in a way that allows private actors to form formal groups (e.g., trade associations); and (d) as a guarantor of civil behaviors among parties. The approximation for institutional quality must be carefully chosen. The standard proxy variables that are typically employed in the literature with respect to the resource curse are indices such as ICRG, BERI, BI ratings (pioneered by Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995), and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) suggested by Kaufmann et al. (2010). However, a potential bias in these indicators may arise from the fact that they are based on the subjective assessments of respondents. For instance, the evaluators may be more likely report that governance in a country is good during times of strong economic performance. The use of CIM also has potential risks if the measure is idiosyncratic and irrelevant to contract enforcement and property rights. Clague et al. (1999) reviewed case studies from several countries and found that CIM is a good measure of institutional quality, though some country examples demonstrate idiosyncratic cases. We also use the indicators of governance used by Kaufmann et al. (2010) such as Voice and Accountability (VA), Political Stability and the Absence of Violence (PA), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and Control of Corruption (CC)—with CIM, was illustrated to examine the suitability of CIM as an institutional quality variable. Data Sources: -Incomome per capita growth rate (annual %) - World Bank database (1991-2010); - Institutional quality: Contract-Intensive Money - World Bank database (1991-2010); - Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (% of GDP)-World Bank database (1991-2010); - Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forestry rents (% of GDP) -World Bank database (1991-2010); - Weighted Average of Worldwide Governance Indicators Kaufmann et al. (2010): (i)One of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators: Government Effectiveness Kaufmann et al. (2010) (ii)One of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators: Rule of Law Kaufmann et al. (2010) - Net barter terms of trade index, (2000=100) - World Bank database (1991-2010); - Log of Initial income per capita - Sachs and Warner (1995); - Ethnic fractionalization index - Alesina et al. (2003); - Linguistic fractionalization index -Alesina et al. (2003);

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    The data comes from the household survey in Nyabihu District (Rwanda) in 2012. This data is used for doctoral research on "The Determinants of Long-Term Growth in Smallholder Farmers in Rwanda: An Intergenerational Analysis". The surveyed households were initially surveyed in 1986 by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) under the study on "Commercialization of Agriculture under Population Pressure" (See von Braun et al., 1991: http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/rr85.pdf)

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    The basic econometric model for the suggested interaction effect of resource endowments and institutional quality on economic growth is borrowed from Boschini et al., 2007 and Brunnschweiler, 2007. The approximation for institutional quality must be carefully chosen. The standard proxy variables that are typically employed in the literature with respect to the resource curse are indices such as ICRG, BERI, BI ratings (pioneered by Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995), and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) suggested by Kaufmann et al. (2010). However, a potential bias in these indicators may arise from the fact that they are based on the subjective assessments of respondents. For instance, the evaluators may be more likely report that governance in a country is good during times of strong economic performance. The use of CIM also has potential risks if the measure is idiosyncratic and irrelevant to contract enforcement and property rights. Clague et al. (1999) reviewed case studies from several countries and found that CIM is a good measure of institutional quality, though some country examples demonstrate idiosyncratic cases. We also use the indicators of governance used by Kaufmann et al. (2010) such as Voice and Accountability (VA), Political Stability and the Absence of Violence (PA), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), and Control of Corruption (CC)—with CIM, was illustrated to examine the suitability of CIM as an institutional quality variable.

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    The data on 400 semi-subsistence household surveys conducted in the Khorezm province and southern districts of the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan.

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    The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the Natural Resource Governance Institute, the Brookings Institutions, the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.

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    The dataset comprises administrative data regarding fiscal decentralization (intergovernmental transfers, municipal expenditures, and local revenues), nutrition (stunting, wasting and underweight for children under five years old), health-related indicators (access to safe water and sanitation), as well as other control variables (area, population, distance to the sea) for the 314 municipalities in Bolivia, for the years 2001 and 2012.

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    The State Legitimacy Indicator considers the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. The Indicator looks at the population’s level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies. Though the State Legitimacy indicator does not necessarily make a judgment on democratic governance, it does consider the integrity of elections where they take place (such as flawed or boycotted elections), the nature of political transitions, and where there is an absence of democratic elections, the degree to which the government is representative of the population of which it governs. The Indicator takes into account openness of government, specifically the openness of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, or conversely the levels of corruption, profiteering, and marginalizing, persecuting, or otherwise excluding opposition groups. The Indicator also considers the ability of a state to exercise basic functions that infer a population’s confidence in its government and institutions, such as through the ability to collect taxes.

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    Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. This table lists the individual variables from each data source used to construct this measure in the Worldwide Governance Indicators

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    A survey of agricultural households was conducted in early 2011 in order to provide background information on landownership, size of operation, rice production, input use, and farm practices in rural communities, as well as to identify and assess existing climate change adaptation strategies. A resurvey was conducted in late 2012 to build on the initial round of the survey, known as the Bangladesh Climate Change Adaptation Survey, with a greater focus on gender and asset dynamics. We tried to track all the households including the split with an attrition rate of 2.66 percent.e this template for data such as statistics, surveys, etc.

  • Production-related data for the main crops in China: wheat, maize, indica rice, japanoica rice, and soybeans. Data is at least yearly for all variables, whereever possible data is monthly. The database includes crop prices (wholesale, retail, and minimum producer prices, export prices), area of production, production volumes, temperature variables, hours of sunshine, prices for different fertilizers, wages for different types of labor, and exchange rates. For many variables data is available on the province level, for some variables data is only available on the national level.